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I. Introduction 
This paper will present.a framework for viewing North-South economic 
relations which, it is hoped, will facilitate positive analysis, and 
contribute toward normative prescriptions regarding the desirable trend 
of North-South economic relations in the future. 
Possible social and economic typologies of "Southern", or less develope(._ 
countries (LDCs), will first be explored, as international economic links 
differ in ioportance among groups of states. Key features-of the political 
econony of the "Northern countries" (DCs) will also be examined. The 
arena of interaction between North and South will then be discussed, 
focusing on fundamental asymmetries in the working of the international 
economic system. This will be followed by more detailed analysis of inter­
national commodity and factor markets. The impiications of such analysis 
for international aid and economic monetary reform will be discussed toward 
the end of the paper. 
The economist will quickly recognize the basic theme of this essay: 
the analysis of different types of international markets, viewed as more 
or less desirable mechanisms for handling economic interdependence among 
nations. The desirability of such mechanisms will be judged not only on 
the basis of their purely economic efficiency, but also on whether they 
help or hinder the achievement of other national goals. The point is to 
-2-
search for mechanis~s to handle international interdependence which are 
compatible with the pursuit of a variety of purely national goals. The 
search is motivated by the assumption that two apparently contradictory 
forces will continue to dominate this century: a technology which makes 
the international division of labor econOC1ically attractive, and a 
desire for political and cultural self-determination of states and/or 
ethnic groups. 
The paper will view markets as creatures of social and political 
systems, not as mechanisms arising spontaneously and inevitably out of 
economic necessity. Which markets are allowed to operate and how, which 
are encouraged and which are repressed are political decisions, both 
nationally and internationally. On the other hand, there are.in some 
cases technical difficulties which even a £inn political will to create 
an international market may be unable to overcome at reasonable social 
costs. Other mechanisms may then be called upon to handle international 
interdependence. 
II. The South: Types and Strategies 
LDC economic and political heterogeneity, more so than that of DCs, 
presents a. difficult barrier to generalizations about North-South relations. 
But postwar research on LDCs has yielded some "laws of development," which 
can be helpful in sorting out a manageable number of LDC types, at least 
in the economic sphere. 
The work of Kuznets and Chenery, in particular, has isolated certain 
impressive regularities in the path toward higher per capita income. 1 
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Huch of the observed variation in the productive structure and export 
pattern of LDCs can be econooetrically explained by per capita income and 
by population. A third important variable is the endowment of natural 
resources of a givea ccuntry. In other words, if one knows, for a given 
LDC, per capita ir.cJ'"-::l, po,)ulation and resource endm-1t1en t (somehow 
quantified), one can ~ilke a very good guess about the structure of pro­
duction anci foreign tr.~.i,;: in th.it country. 
One can thus differentiate between large and small LDCs, and between 
those relatively rich in natural resources and those which are not. As 
each type of country naves up the per capita incane ladder, its productive 
and international trade structures will change in a fairly predictable 
way, given contemporary technology. A large, resource-poor country with 
a low per capita income, such as India, will have different priorities 
for its economic interactions with DCs, than a smaller, relatively resource­
rich LDC, already well along the per capita income ladder, such as Chile. 
The Kuznets-Chenery empirical patterns of growth also suggest that once 
the three major objective facts listed in the previous. paragraph are taken 
into account, the key variable influencing changes in productive and trade 
structure is the growth rate of per capita income. Domestic policies, this 
line of thought would arcue, will affect those structures mainly via their 
impact on per capita incane growth. Indeed, domestic policies trying to 
change those structures directly, in contradiction with the three objective 
facts, will simply decrease the growth rate, without much changing the 
productive and trade structures of the country (e.g.,·the case of Uruguay, 
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which defied.its "fate" or pattern as a small, resource-rich country). 
The above has a deter..iinistic flavor leaving little room, apparently, 
for policy innovation, except insofar as it can accelerate ~rowth. It 
could be countered, inter alia• that such generalizations are based on 
observations of more or less .market-oriented LDCs. leaving aside the 
experience of socialist countries. Yet, there is some evidence suggest­
inG that the invariance of productive structures except to the three 
objective variables also extends to socialist countries. It could be that 
the major difference between a socialist and a capitalist LDC of the same 
per capita incane, population and natural resource endowment ·will be not 
in productive and foreign trade structure, but on the structure and dis­
tribution of public and private consunption and investment. The str~king 
originality most observers find in the Cuban economy, for example, does 
not certainly lie in its production and trade structure, which probably 
fits well in the Kuznets-Chenery patterns. But. more evidence is certainly 
needed in the comparison of socialist and non-s~cialist trade, production 
and expenditure structures. The experiences of the Peoples' Republic of 
China, in particular, are only beginning to be incorporated systematically 
into development studies. It remains to be seen whether and when sucn 
incorporation will yield another Indian-type observation, or something 
qualitatively different. 
So some of the detenninistic flavor arising from the descriptive 
"laws of development" disappears when one considers the_political and econo-
mic possibility that a given pattern of production and trade, broadly defined, 
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will be co~patible with more than one pattern of expenditures and income 
distribution. Tl1e latter patterns tr..ay differ in the balance of consumption 
of private an<l public goods, in the level of other social services, in the 
equity of inccne distribution, etc. A priori, one could argue that such 
difference., will be re£1-ec ted in the pattern of production and trade. The 
hypothesis is that the link is weak, and overshadowed by the three variables 
discussed earlier. 
This hypothesis receives some support from recent simulation exercises 
showing that even radical redistribution experiments affect the sectorial 
composition of gross output only modestly, and that resulting indirect 
effects on importation, and on capital and labor use are correspondingly nodest. 
Moreover, even or more concentrated income distributions seem feasible 
under a variety of b~sic development strategies.
2 
From the above it follows that in today's world the manner in which 
the international economic links of a given LDC will influence its domestic 
eco~omy, its expenditure structure and its intemal political balance can­
not be assumed mechanically from a knowledge of its trade pattern. Exports 
of sugar may strengthen the oligarchical power of landlords and.finance 
luxury consumption, or sustain the building of socialism. 
Regardless of uhich groups are leading and controlling the process of 
capital accumulation, determining the distribution of its fruits, and 
the burdens of adjusting to change, a given LDC will have an interest in 
international economic relations which will vary depending on its incane, 
population and natural resources, but which in almost all cases is likely 
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to be strong.and viewed as a potential source of econauic gains. The 
gains ;;ill be mainly those usually associated with the division of labor, 
whether in coouodities or technology. During transitional or revolutionary 
periods, rejections of the international link may occur, but such withdra¼al 
will typically end with the establishment of a new political order. 
The international link, of course, can be manipulated by the ruling 
groups or classes not only to achieve broad socioeconomic goals, but also 
to strengthen their omi narrow economic or political interests. Ruling 
LDC groups, for example, may be eager to welcome direct foreign investment 
from a hegemonic country not for the sake of obtaining capital or techno­
logy, but with the expectation that by thus tying the fortunes of those 
investors to the political survival of the allied LDC groups, their power 
will be strengthened by the acquisition of lobbyists within the councils 
of the rich and powerful. 
To avoid misunderstanding it should be stressed that the "laws of 
development" obtained using data generated by postwar history and technology 
will not necessarily apply to 19th or 21st Century circumstances. But at 
the very least they offer a compact and manageable summary of the hetero­
geneity of the LDCs. 
III. The North: What Hatters Most for the South 
From the viewpoint of the South, the following interrelated questions· 
are the most crucial regarding Northern economic characteristics. Is the 
Northern demand for Southern goods and services expanding fast? Are the 
Northern countries competitors vis-a-vis the South, or do they tend to 
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present a common, cartelized front in most economic transactions? Are 
there groups vrit)0 in the DCs which have specific ar..d quantit.'.ltively stror.r, 
economic intercs:s in LDCs, and are there raany or few? If there are such 
groups, are they politically powerful within the DCs, so that they exert 
an itlportant influence on DC _public policy toward LDCs? 
Historically, for a given LDC the typical answers to these questions 
were not encoura0ing: LDCs dealt with DC economic groups which were few 
and concentrated, ;.;hich had the ear of th~ir respective governments and 
whose well-bein0 uere perceived to depend heavily on profits froo LDC opera­
tions. Rivalries bet\1een DC economic interests were kept down by formal or 
infortial divisions of the third world, assuring each hegemonic power of its 
own preserve. DC demand for LDC products, quite dynamic before the First World 
War, turned sluggish between then and the 1950s, except for petroleum. 
The picture for the 1960s reveals some improvement for the LDCs, 
reflecting slow-working historical forces. The full presence of the USSR 
in the world scene has introduced not only just one new major competitor 
among the great industrialized powers, but also one with an ideology making 
it less likely to play by the old rules of the capitalistic game. Further­
more, with the passing of cold war confrontation, the presence of the 
USSR need not reduce competition within the capitalist camp, opening up a 
potentially more fluid world scene for at least some LDCs. 
While the presence of the USSR has essentially provided a security 
lmlbrella for some LDCs, under which economic and political decisions have 
been taken which in the old days would have led to ove-rt or covert military 
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intervention by capitalistic LDCs, the postwar economic expansion of 
Japan has brougl,t back into the world stage ar1 actor n.issing since around 
the First World \Jar: a rapidly growing, resource-poor, industrial archi­
pela~o with a high propensity to import primary products. 
The ir:;prc,;-;::d ar,d still ~xpanding economic and political expertise 
of LDC policy oakers has allowed aany of these countries to take advantage 
of the more favorable world circuo.stances, .to achieve not only economic 
goale but also a more effective degree of national autonomy. Yet, the 
interplay between forces toward cartelization and those for rivalry and 
competition is far from settled in the North. Evidence could be produced 
for the argument that either one or the other is likely to prevail, say, 
during the next ten years. On the cartelization side consider, for example, 
trends toward Western European unity, US-USSR cooperation, concentration of 
capitalistic trade and production in multinational corporations, and increasing 
cross investr>lents in the securities markets. But my o~m guess is that the 
presence of a socialist camp which does not threaten militarily Western Europe 
-and-Japan tips the scale in favor of a scenario of at least oligopolistic 
rivalry among DC economic interests, permanently at the verge of warfare. 
3 
Such warfare, even assuming it remains purely economic, is not with­
out some dangers for LDCs. It could lead to a breakdo~m of prosperous, 
multilateral world trade, reducing world demand for LDC products and 
rekindling pressures for reviving neo-colonial "special relationships" 
between subsets of DCs and LDCs. Under those circumstances, LDCs could 
suffer not only from concentrated DC economic groups using their political 
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power, but also from an increase in populist DC pressures, such as those 
arising from beet far:ers and textile producers in those countries. 
IV. The Choic,2 of Ar~nas of :forth-South Econonic Interaction 
It is tempting to separate North-South interactions into political 
and econora1ic :;p:,"re~s, the farmer being direct and the latter indirec~, 
operating via different markets. The distinction, of course,· cannot be 
that clear cut. In particular, market rules of the game, and the determina­
tion of which markets are allowed to operate, are essentially political 
decisions. Power, whether military or corporate, abhors an uncontrolled 
and truly competitive market. It would be an extraordinary world in which 
asyr.une~ries in military and political power were not reflected in asymnetries 
in economic relations. 
This seems quite straightforward, and has been at the root of "center­
periphery" or dependencia schemes for a long time. Yet, by a curious psycho­
logical mechanism, similar to that which leads some to blame the victim for 
a crime, even informed liberal opinion in DCs often views LDCs emphasis on 
such asymmetry with ill-disguised inpatience, or with a curious eagerness 
to show up minor inconsistencies in LDC arguments. 
Take, as an illustration, the goal of world economic efficiency. A pure 
technocrat would know that there are several possible wa:ys of approaching 
that target: freer trade in commodities, freer international capital move­
ments, or freer labor migration. It may not be necessary, in fact, to 
follow all of those policies, as trade and factor movements are all substi­
tutes for each other, at least in the type of models on which efficiency policy 
advice is often bused. 
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The obvious question is: why not seek world 
e±'Hciency via lccbo::- r.:o·ve:::ents instead of capital rn.o"rer:--.ents? Or why via 
sone tnJe of ca.pi tal move:,ients ( direct foreign investment) rather than 
ot::1ers (port:::~olio i,nrestment)? Why world efficiency is sought via one 
Co':'!bination O"I.~ pol.:.cies (capital having the option of going to ir.nnobile 
laoor), rat11er tha.'1 wi ~h other possible packages is explained less by re­
ferences to 1'1althusia."i specters than by looking at who makes the rules regard­
ing which markets ar~ to operate 1 and how. 
It is instructive to compare actual Western European treatment of 
immigrant labor with the treatment some LDCs. have trie_d to impose on immi­
grant capital, and which has incurred the disfavor of many economists 
worried about the inefficiency and "irrationality" of th9~~ rules. A related 
comparison could have been made between US treatment of Mexican labor and 
Mexican treatment of US capital. Consider the follouing aspects: 
(a) The Calvo doctrine: It is taken for granted that Turks working in 
Germany will be subject to German laws and that th~ Turkish government will 
act at most as a friend in court if one of its nationals gets in trouble 
while in Germany. The Calvo doctrine applies :f'ull.y here I and no one has pro­
posed1 as far ~ I know, special international arbitra.tion tribunals to 
settle disputes between guest workers and host nations, as in the case of 
guest capital. 
(b) Fade-out rules: Most ~-!estem European countries appear to encour-
age guest workers to go back home after a few years. Few incaning workers 
are led to believe they can stay forever. Rotation has been a key word. 
(c) Discrimination between nationals and foreigners: A few European 
liberals have proposed the principle of non-discrimination between nationals 
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and foreigners (expected in the case of capital), in such things as 
social and job security, access to housin~, etc. But in practice, when 
not in law, the treat::!ent is discritinatory. While during recessions in 
LDCs foreign investors are more likely than d0t:1estic entrepreneurs to have 
access to credit, guest .;orkers are typically the first to feel the 
5burden of slack denand in Europe. 
(d) Discrimination anong foreigners according to nationality: This 
is a practice frowned upon when LDCs use it in the case of guest capi­
talists. Both de facto and de jure European countries discriminate not 
only between workers from inside and outside the European Economic Com­
munity, but.also among those from outside countries. 
(e) Consultation regarding the framing and the changing of regulations: 
Guest capitalists, and often their source country government, will howl 
if new rules are sprung on them by host governments without previous dis­
cussions. The European community commission recently held a conference 
on migrant workers attended by close to 900 experts, administrators and 
union leaders. "Perhaps symptomatically, there were almost no representa-
rom t emigrant wor ers ' . · h 1tives• t here f h . k organizations t emse ves. 116 
Even the limited European effort at removing imperfections in the 
world labor market seems to be running into serious difficulties. Sociologi­
cal reasons are being brought forth to explain why too high a presence of 
guest workers leads to difficulties. ·l'hresholds of tolerance beyond which 
the presence of foreigners becomes unacceptable to the local population are 
increasingly being referred to. Ugly incidents such as the rash of murders 
of Algerians in Marseilles (or the murders of u.s. executives in Argentina?) 
are part of the price of going beyond the thresholds. 
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T:~e _point of the nrevious discussion is ooviously ~ to suce;est th2.t 
free inte:rn?.tional ::i.igation is the optir:-.al path to worldwid.e factor :price 
equalization. '.i'i1e purpose has been to highlight the fact that what markets 
are allowed to operate more or less freely and/or which inperfections re­
ceive nost attention by both journalists and mainstream social scientists in 
the rich cormtries are neither rc.nc.0:1 nor selected by purely technocratic 
criteria. In a similar vein, the asymmetrical handling by DCs of different 
types of capital outflow could be explored; while most subsidize their DFI 
via insurance schemes and tax policies, they haraper free foreign access 
to their capital markets. In a very imperfect ~orld, the choice of 
imperfections ,to decry and tackle is a matter of subjective judgment, 
often justified on grounds of common sense or "realism." But. let us try 
to be clear as to what usually determines "realism" and whose common sense 
we are talking about. 7 
Furthermore, the point .of the previous discussion is not to argue 
that the asymmetries in the international economic order will inevitably 
. lead to losses for LDCs; the argument implied that whether or not they 
gain, or how much they gain, and how m~ch of the bµrdens of adjustment they 
are likely to bear, has been a secondary importance to those responsible 
for setting or changing the rules of the game. 
V. The Path Toward One World: A Digression 
Before taking a closer look at markets for commodities and factors of 
production, sane discussion is necessary on the different perceptions by 
North and South of concepts of "nationalism" and "internationalism" or 
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"coS!:!opolitanisn." 'l'hose perceptions influence attitudes tm:ard ·which 
mechanisns of interdepencence si10uld be used ar:.on~ states and toward 
which markets should be eophasized as arenas of interaction between North 
and South. Those attitudes are also manipulated by vested interests to 
obtain the1r o,-m private ends. 
Put briefly, in the North nationalism evokes Hitler, Mussolini, pre-
1959 Franco, Enoch Powell and George Wallace. At best, it evokes Gaullist 
France, although judging from the often outrageous US and UK press treatmer,t 
of General De Gaulle and his successors, the difference between French 
nationalism and the others may be perceived as slight. In the Soucn, coStaopol-
itanism evokes memories of distant foreign Kings or Queens or company 
president:1 with different skin colors, different tongues (or at least. . 
different accents) and different cultures. In the North, nationalism was 
misused not long ago to suppress human dignity, rights of self-determination 
and cultural heterogeneity. The flag of cosmopolitanism has been used in 
the South for the same purposes. If patriotism is the last refuge of the 
scoundrel, cosmopolitanism is the favorite fig leaf of the imperialist. 
Before going further, it should be borne in mind that, as in the case 
of economic conditions, Southern nationalisms are quite heterogeneous. }lost 
8LDCs (and DCs) are multiethnic or multiculture states. In some areas, such 
as Latin America,.loyalty to the state overlaps fairly closely with loyalty 
to the national culture or ethnic group, broadly defined or perceived, while 
in others, such as in many new African states, strong tensions are likely to 
remain between different ethnic "nati·ons" or cultural groups brought to­
gether under the same state. Without denying the importance of those · 
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tensions, and related lm1r;uar,e prob lens, such as those in India,· in this paper 
we t-1ill be concerned prio.arily uith the type of LDC nationalisr.1 ;,ri1ich rallies 
loyalty to the ntate as a mechanism to defend the culturc(s) and self-respect 
of LJC peoples, against wittinB or unwitting encroachnents originating in DCs. 
Its primarily defensive. nature is the key characteristic of this type 
of LDC nationalism. It is not a matter of promoting loyalty to one's state 
to suppress other countries. or to brag about being "number one." It is 
a matter of protJ.oting cultural survival and self-respect. While aggressive,, 
nationalism, historically found mainly in DCs, finds a need to create 
myths about the intrinsic inferiority of other states and nations that it 
seeks to dominate, defensive nationalism may at worst prcmote a general 
mistrust of foreigners. a feeling likely to remain vague and pacific so 
long as the foreigners do not come into ·one's own turf trying to dominate. 
Hegemonic powers will tend to cloak their nationalism with claims 
to be promoting internationalisms; in Orwellian fashion they argue that 
promoting their independence, say of imported oil, will really lead to world• 
interdependence, or will say that proletarian internationalism calls for 
putting down proletarians with foreign tanks. They often will justify 
their own nationalistic actions as being taken only after the rest of the 
-·~orld has selfishly and foolishly rejected benevolent hegemonic leaderships; 
this is the "Noble Siegfried syndrome." The rhetorical excesses of LDC 
defensive nationalism typically do not include these mental contortions. 
Clearly, neither nationalism nor internationalism can be judsed as good 
or bad independently of historical circumstances. Few defenders of LDC 
nationalism will justify it as an end in itself. llmnanity, one hopes, 
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moves t0t1ard · beconin; oae nation, but premature cosmopolitanism imposed 
by hc£_;e:::onic pc~,-crs cd..'1 be as negative for the march toward that goal as 
anachronistic tribalis::i.. ~1y hypothesis is that the optimal path for the 
South, in route to true intcrnationalisn, should take it through national 
self-assertion and d~fensive nationalism. Even under extremely favorable 
circumstances, li~e the case of Puerto Rico, jumping stages (particularly 
by passive choice) yields ambiguous social and psychological results. 
Ideologists for multinational empires of all times have sung the benefits 
to peace and to the economy of suppressing national particularisms, exceptin3 
of course those of the hegeI:1onic power. The long run results of such Augustean 
ages and short-cuts to one world have been so far most unimpressive. 
Even within the South, of course, the mystique surrounding the state 
can be misused. A dominant class, ethnic or cultural group vithin an LDC can 
turn that powerful potential engine of growth and integration toward buttressing 
its own power, or suppressing weaker ethnic or cultural gro.ups. But it 
would be a mistake to think that nationalism is just the creation of a 
dominant class or an elite to maintain its power; it goes deeper than that, 
particularly in states fairly homogenous culturally or ethnically. An-
other possible retrogressive use of nationalism in the third world involves 
opposition to regional integration schemes which are potentially favorable 
for both economic and political reasons in areas without deep ethnic or 
cultural cleavaees. Under those circunstances, some LDC nationalisms can 
also become anachronistic, and a barrier in the path toward a more effi-
cent defensive nationalisn, structured around a larger political unit. 
But it is not inconceivable that larg2LDCs nay try imposing regional. 
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hegemonies mostly for their own profit, provoking defensive (and healthy) 
. h • 1· IInationalistic reaction~ from other LDCs against sue IIpre.aature regiona is:-:i. 
Finally, LDC nationalisns could be nanipulated by the North to decrease 
Third World solidarity. 
The subject matter is ambiguous and cannot be settled a priori and, 
in general, independently of specific circumstances. Put simply, the 
abtive discussion suggests that nationalisms.should be judged by their pro­
mised or realized fruits. In the South, they have eno:rI11ous potential for 
raising living standards as well as human dignity and self-respect. That 
such an instrument can be misused iR no ar~ment for. thrm-ri.nc· it amiy. 
Particularly while those historically in the position of leading the way 
toward the fadinB away of nationalims, the DCs, shm<T no sign of doing so. 
The ambiguities surrounding the issue of nationalism may explain the 
wildly different responses evoked, even among scholars, by different his­
torical attempts at "nation building." Contrast, for example, attitudes 
toward the struggles led by Attaturk and those l~d by Isabel and Ferdinand 
The same observers who are appalled by language riots in India, or tribal 
clashes in Africa, will often sympathize with the actions of separatist 
Basques, Ukranians and Puerto Ricans. And more than one nationalistic 
intellectual has been taught the value of transnational alliances by a 
tyrant in his homeland. 
One last word on this messy subject. History, especially colonial 
history, has left us:with a crazy-quilt of states and arbitrary boundaries 
(just look at a political map of the Caribbean!). But·one must be sus­
picious of possible uses of ad hoc arguments pointing to the irrationality 
< ---
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of having a few tho-.is~,--.,.i citizcr-.s of c<Y.mtry :~ or Y controllir..g high 
percentages of this or that .-.'orlcl resource. The suspicion is strengthened 
by the realization ti,at the DCs • where one often hears that argtnnent, in 
the past often deliberately helped to create such small or sparsely popu­
lated countries. with the excuse of promoting national self-expression. 
Exanples include US involv~~ent in the creation of the Republic of Panana, 
and British policy in the Persian Gulf. Note that even today the British 
cla:im to defend the rights of self-expression of the handful of people on 
Gibraltar, placed there by the British in the first place. against Spanish 
claims. Furthermore, having a small percentage of t~e world's population 
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controllinz a huge share of the production of a given resource does not 
appear, prL~a facie, more shocking than similar calculations for consumption 
of the saoe resources. Eventually the world cor.lr.lunity may handle both 
matters more equitably and rationally; right now the discovery by some in 
the DCs of the irrationality of existing LDC states and boundaries must 
be regarded with skepticism and_concern. 
If the primacy and persistence of desires for national self-determina­
tion are granted, we should seek arenas of North-South economic interaction 
compatible both with LDC goals of greater autonomy, and economic advantage 
for all participants. Economists have traditionally viewed competitive 
markets as theoretically capable and reconciling individual freedom with 
an efficient and interdependent social division of labor. We now turn to 
examine whether this vision is relevant for contemporary North-South 
economic relations. In particular, we will want to ask the following 
questions of actual or potential international markets, besides the 
traditional ones about their efficiency and competitiveness: 
(a) Can transactions be carried out at "arm •·s-length"? How much 
will those international economic links intrude into the national social 
and political life of participants? In short, can arenas for standoffish 
arrangements be created?. 
(b) Can international markets provide the goods and services desired 
by LDCs in separate compartments, or in packages which can be decomposed 
if the buyer wants_a part of them, but not others? Can the LDCs abstain 
fran participating in some international markets, without impairing their 
chances of becoraing effective buyers or sellers in other international markets? 
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(c) CJ;1 i:1 t.e:::uational narkets provide contracts which have clear 
ter.::ination dates, or ,:hich have l;uilt-in renegotiating provisions? 
In general, of course, the unintrusiveness, deconposibility and re­
versibility of ca:u:-£rcial arrangements will be interrelated. On t11e 
whole, the narc conpctitive an international market, the raore likely it 
is that it will have these desirable characteristics. 
VI. Co1.;._'7odity (Silent?) Trade .. 
Surveying the world trade scene in 1973, it appears that both LDCs 
I 
and DCs have ~uch to gain from the maintenance and expansion of commodity 
trade. It also seetis that such trade could be carried out in the future 
in a manner which allows each community a plentiful amount of control 
over its own economy and society. It can have some of the quality of 
unintrusiveness anthropologists find in the "silent trade" undertaken 
between primitive tribes. 
That LDCs, particularly the smaller LDCs, niay gain a good deal by 
active participation in international cotmnodity trade would seem to be 
another obvious proposition, to be taken for granted. Yet it still meets 
with considerable resistance, perhaps because the proposition in the past 
was framed in terms of the inevitability of gains fran trade to everybody. 
There was also, and there still is, a good deal of misplaced concreteness 
attributing to commodities intrinsically desirable or undesirable quali­
ties, e.g., sugar and coffee are bad, butter and steel are good. While 
such views have some use in understanding the economic history of countries 
with weak central governments, they are far less useful for many conteo.porary 
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LDCs \·.'fliCh have a respectable array of policy tools ui:;able to correct 
distortions and defoma.tions ,-:hich coul<l arise from staple exports. t,ote 
that a recent slogan of the Cuban revolutionary government is: "Sugar for 
Growth." The historical link bet\:cen exports of pritiary products, open 
eco:10::.ies .ind landlord-dc::iinated renressive govern..1ents can still be seen 
in several LDCs, and in sane countries it t:iay have been strengthened by 
the 1972-73 coc~odity boom, but there are now enough counter-examples to 
show that such link is no iron-law. 
Iloth LUC export pessimists. and those in DCs which delight in con­
vincing poor countries of their alleged econanic impotence, not long 
ago used to argue that imports from LDCs were of marginal :iI:lportance to 
the rich, and their purchase was presented almost as an act of DC 
altruism. Altruism, of course, which could be terminated if LDCs were 
naughty; witness the el:inination of imports of Cuban sugar into the US 
during the early 1960s and the boycott of Iranian oil in the 1950s. Hypotheses 
regarding the importance of cheap raw materials and primary products from 
the South for the prosperity of the North were brushed aside during the late 
1950s and 1960s by pointing to small percentages of those imports in gross na­
tional product. Arguments about supply reliability were also deemed mistaken or 
naive: it was all a matter of price, it was noted. Only frantic radicals 
or third-world types could be expected to take seriously the notion that 
Northern foreign policies had anything at all to do with assuring those 
countries with cheap and reliable supplies of primary products from the 
South. Events in commodity markets during 1972 and 1973, particularly the 
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oil situation, have shaken those DC perceptions. Indeed, anong some 
DC observers attitudes on these matters have gone from indifference or 
coritc::1pt ·to a somewhat paranoid hysteria. 
The discussion of conmodity trade so far has a decidedly old­
fashioned flavor; nothir,3 has been said of trade in manufactured 3oods, 
billed often as the new breakthrough in LDC exports. For some LDCs, main­
ly those with a poor natural resource endot-ment, those exports no doubt 
offer hope to break out of severe foreign exchange limitations. But it 
seems far from inevitable or desirable that successful development for 
all LDCs must be characterized by a sharp increase in the share of manu­
factures in their export bill. Many can expect to follow a path similar 
to that of Australia, Denmark or New Zealand, a path in which_growing 
industrialization of productive structure need not be accompanied by a 
corresponding change in the export bill structure. 
From several vieupoints, those LDCs may be regarded as the lucky 
ones. The luck, in the first place, is in their endowment of natural 
resources, producing export values which typically include large pure 
rents, i.e., those exports have low danestic resource costs. One could, 
of course, have too much of a good thing, if in the very long run ex­
cessive rents lead to a flabby society, unable to adapt to new circum-
stances when the rent-yielding resources become exhausted. Secondly, 
and regardless of what happened in earlier historical periods, internation­
al markets in 1973 for primary products are often more standoffish than 
those for the new manufactured exports. Placing soybeans, cotton or 
copper in international markets will involve less dependent relation-
ships with foreigners than trying to sell internationally Ford engines, 
parts of Olivetti typet.rriters or bits and pieces of electronic equipment. 
The difference is negligible when the comparison is made with steel, cenent 
or flat glass, but excepting textiles not much of the celebrated increase in 
LDC manufactured exports seem to be in the category of standardized finished 
industrial goods, sold in open competitive oarkets. Put differently, LDC 
comparative disadvantage in international marketing is less of a problem with 
primary products than with many c1anufactured exports. Finally,_ there has been 
a remarkable trend, which may be deemed basically irreversible, toward LDC 
control over the exploitation and marketing of those natural resources. Such 
control, incidentally, may result in more corapetitive world markets in com­
modities using _those resources as inputs, as LDC nationalizations have dimin­
ished the oligopolistic power of several vertically integrated companies. 
For many LDCs, participation of private and public national-entrepreneurs is 
greater in primary product exports than in those of manufactures. 
The dependence associated with exports of many types of manufactured 
goods would naturally increase if they were to occur only thanks to 
tariff preferences granted by DCs to favorite LDCs. Under those circum­
stances, it is not difficult to foresee that the major LDC exports benefit­
ting from such schemes will be those produced by firms owned by citizens 
of those Uorthern countries granting special trade preferences. A case 
can still be made for generalized and unconditional DC preferences granted 
to all LDCs, but the likely benefits to LDCs from politically feasible 
schemes of that sort appear out of proportion to the attention they have 
received during the last ten years. 
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From all that has been said so far, it should be clear that commodity 
trade under steady ~ultilateral rules of the game, and in open and 
competitive markets, is a possible arena of economic interaction between 
LOC~ ;mrl flCc, offeri.n~ arr::m~c:-:cnts which are econooically efficient Fhile 
maintainin~ desirable characteristics of unintrusiveness, reversibility and 
deco111posibility. Historically, such arena has not existed. lforthem 
countries first developed their LDC sources of prit:lary products 
W1der colonial or neo-colonial circumstances, and throughout have mani­
pulated rules of the cane in international com111odity markets mostly to 
suit their own ends, not hesitating to change then as their own con­
venience dictated. Protection to Northern farmers has taken precedence 
during peacetime over commitments to trade liberalization. 
The most recent exanple of asymmetrical DC attitudes toward internation-
al commodity r.iarkets is the outcry regarding "freedom of access" to rmJ materials 
and alleged "cartelization" by LDCs. During 1953-70, when commodity prices were 
low or tending to fall, DCs argued that international commodity uarkets 
wrked best when left alone, including those which even then gave evidence 
of being either fragmented or far from competitive (diamonds and oil under 
the ancien regime of the seven sisters). On the-other hand, since at 
least the Second World Har, LDCs have argued the case for commodity agreements 
which would avoid price instability. At first sight, it would appear that 
this is the right time to resurrect plans for generalized stabilization of 
commodity markets, giving DCs security about "access on equal terns to the 
trade and to the raw materials of the .world," as put by the Atlantic Charter, 
in exchange for assuring LDCs of reliable markets at predictable prices.
9 
The case for a world-wide "ever-normal granary" has been strengthened 
by the 1973 inflationary pressures, which have baffled the most learned 
macroeconomists of the industrialized world. In retrospect, and on the 
basis of a nee-structuralist view of inflation, it can be argued that 
one of the benefits obtained by the industrialized countries from low or 
falling LDC export prices during 1953-70, coupled to the reserves generated 
by US agriculture, was a relatively stable price level. More than a 
few DC observers are putting their hope for an end of the present inflationary 
burst on a collapse of primary product prices from their 1972-73 levels. 
It should not be beyond the wits of a rational world community to devise 
generalized commodity agreements which, without interfering with long-run 
price trends, smooth out violent price fluctuations which can trigger 
inflationary spirals, and provide stocks against natural calamities. 
Failures of past sporadic commodity agreements could be blamed on lack of 
political will among participants and on technical weaknesses as much as 
on intrinsic failings of such arrangements. 
It should be noted that even at the purely technical level, it is not 
clear that a competitive market will generate efficient results for the 
case of exhaustible natural resources. In an uncertain world, lacking a 
full set of futures and insurance markets, the market mechanism can become 
an unreliable means of pricing and allocating those resources, generating 
myopic decisions and considerable price instability.10 
So which mechanism is more desiraple in the COllllllodity area: imperfect 
markets or imperfect canmodity agreements? Given the mediw-term outlook 
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of demand for LDC commodities, which even discounting the excesses of the 
1972/73 commodity boom is reasonably good, I end up leaning toward the 
former. Unequal LDC bargaining power and interests would make generalized 
commodity agreements difficult to negotiate, and would present Northern 
countries rich opportunities to "divide and rule." Outside a few possible 
special cases, such as oil or copper, LDC bargaining pouer could best be 
employed in broadening and improving existing international t.1arkets; DC com­
mitments regarding freedom of access to their markets and a gradual end of 
their protectionism must be the necessary price for their gaining freedom 
of access to LDC supplies. In some commodity markets, greater use can 
be made of long-term contracts, as substitutes for missing futures markets. 
More thought could also be given to improving the latter. Fear of los­
ing access to raw materials has led some DC observers to dream of reviving 
"special relationships" with selected LDCs; on balance, LDCs have much to 
gain from multilateral markets free of nee-colonial overtones. 
Physical control over a good share of the earth's land surface and 
subsoil remains the big LDC asset. Notable improvements in LDC political 
and economic management, plus favorable world market conditions, put 
many of these countries in circumstances unmatched in their contemporary 
history, particularly for taking advantage of export growth for local 
development. 11 
VII. Service Transactions 
International service markets and transactions, and the characteristics 
of participants in them, are more hete_rogeneous than those for commodities. 
Some are quite standardized, and involve many buyers and sellers dealin·g at 
arm's length. Shipping services not controlled by "conferences" approach 
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such description. Other service markets ~ay be quite competitive, but 
their geograpilical dc::iain oay be such as to produce interactions between 
. 12DC and LDC citizens ~:hich are not always satisfactory, sueh as toun.sm. 
A third type of service market, that of technology, or more generally 
non-academic knowled0e, has recently received a considerable a:::1oun t of 
attention. 13 The characteristics of the generation of technology or com­
mercial knowledge, and of the product itself, are typically such as to 
make these markets, particularly those involving DCs and LDCs, far from 
purely competitive ones. 
The market power of DC sellers of technology is buttressed institu­
tionally by the Paris Convention on patents, and by packaging practices 
of multinational corporations (MNCs), on which more will be said below. 
The recent upsurge of interest in the economics and politics of technology 
markets has not yet offset accumulated dismal ignorance regarding their 
mechanisms. Nevertheless, LDC interest in this area appears fully justified. 
It is not obvious, for example, that LDCs benefit from the Paris Convention, 
and a plausible case can be made for the withdrawal of those LDCs which are 
now signataries. The difficult balance between incentives to generate new 
knowledge and the efficient dissemination of existing knowledge appears at 
present overly tilted in favor of the former. 
However, national rather than international action should take clear 
priority in this area. The "knowledge needed to buy knowledge" must be 
built up by the LDCs as-a first step, perhaps in regional associations. 
Regional development banks, and the International Bank for Reconstruction 
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2.r.d :Jevelopr::.ent (I:Li?J) > cc"..ild nelp :r::uc'.': ~ore t:ta.>i in the past (t:ie reccrd. 
here is quite ue.ci), but ir. ccr.tr:,,s:, ,tith t~:e cor..-:ioclit:· area, 2.r~d si::ularl:· 
to the field of fine.nee, ttere is a d::-~'1ger that expansion of internatio!'l.al 
nar~ets and cha..'1nels of inter::iediation nay weaken indispensable local 
:::arl:ets and institut ions. -
The cruel asymmetry in "knowledge about knowledge" between LDC 
buyers and DC sellers must be corrected by f'irst building up LDC-controlled 
expertise and inst,itutions in this area. By now the pool of LDC experts in 
various fields is most impr~ssive, but due to a lack of indigenous institutions 
their work within LDCs is often channelled via foreien or international 
organizations. It is not unusual, for exa-:::ple, to have a DC consultant finn 
obtain a contract in an LDC to be carried out to a large extent by experts 
hired by that finn within the same (or in other) LDCs. 
Once emphasis is given to developing local expertise and institutions, 
LDCs would be in a better position to press for refonn of international 
markets in technolog;y, in some cases using their increased bargaining 
power in commodity markets for that purpose, as some oil exportine LDCs 
have attempted recently. 
Finally, it could be noted that public enterprises of socialist countries, 
at least in some fields, could play an important role in increasing the 
flexibility of international technological markets, as presumably they are 
not as bound by fears of competition used to justify the technological 
secrecy of developed capitalistic finns. But so far their participation 
has been timid. 
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VIII. I:,te:ri,2.tior:~l '.farkets for Labor and Capital 
[npla:me<l intern,-:itional narke ts for unskilled labor are t~1 pically 
characterized by a sharp division betHeen those who in the host country 
reap the fruits froo. a labor inflow, and those who bear the adjustment 
costs to such an inflow. Th~ gains are often quickly reaped, while the 
adjustment costs are dr&wn out and may carry to future generations. This 
explains uass resistance in most DCs to large labor inflows from LOCs. 
The ugly racism in which such resistance often expresses itself should 
not obscure the fact that unplanned international labor flows, such as 
those in Europe, even when benefitting LDC nationals and DC capitalists, 
are also an example of premature cosmopolitanism, difficult to generalize 
q1assively in today's world. Note that within the South such flows also gen-
erate friction; witness the status of Colombian workers in Venezuela and 
that of Paraguayans in Argentina. 
While international markets for unskilled labor are limited and im-
perfect, the market for skilled labor or human capital has undergone 
considerable internationalization since World War II. Two-way flows have 
been established between North and South, often via the intermediation 
of international organizations. Leaving aside those flows from DCs to LDCs 
which are explicitly subsidized, the question has been raised as to whether 
the counter flow from LDCs to DCs, which occurs overwhelmingly as an ostensibly 
commercial transaction, does not contain a perverse subsidization and resource 
transfer from the South to the North. A high degree of canpetitiveness 
in that market is not in doubt; the issue centers on ~he appropriabilitv of 
returns on public investment in education, possible externalities of human 
capital in LDCs, and the manipulation of markets by DCs using asymmetrical 
treatment for different types of labor inflows. 
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Opti::i.al national and international policies in this area, on both econo-
mic and political [;rounds, are likely to exclude both laissez-faire and absolute 
bans on migration. The nunbers involved in these flm,s are soall relative to 
total populations, and should not generate the frictions associated with cass 
uizrat:tons of uns:-:.illed labor to already settled areas. Tax schemes, involvinr.; 
both host and hor.1e countries, and known ex-ante to all concerned, could reconcile 
the legitinate claims of home countries for returns on their public invest-
ment in education and individual desire for mobility. Whether such 
taxes are levied at the tine of exit or are spread out through tir.ie is 
a matter which could be settled on practical grounds, with the latter 
possibility gaining appeal from imperfections of capital markets in an 
uncertain world. If international taxation treaties have been worked out 
for physical capital, similar ones should not be too difficult to estab-
1is. hf hum.an capita.or . 1 14 
The reader will not be surprised if uncontrolled direct foreign 
investment carried out by large MNCs owned by DC: nationals, particular~y 
those fron hegeoonic powers, is regarded in this paper as the major 
example of premature and misguided cos~opolitanism, having most of the 
undesirable characteristics discussed for arenas of LDC-DC economic trans-
action. This i's not the place to sUlllI:J.arize the vast literature of HHCs; 
a few remarks on the subject should be sufficient. 
The relationships between large MNCs and host LDC governments and 
ruling groups, unless closely controlled and watched, are unlikely to be 
standoffish in the sense of keeping at a reasonable and decent distance 
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econooic from political decisions. It can be plausibly argued that the 
sa1:1e can be said re!;arcling the relationships between lEiCs and DC 3ovcrn­
mcnts aud n:lin3 ;;roups. But given the greater frailty of LDC govern-
ments and societies, an even ~reater concern is warranted. Compare, for 
exar.n_1le, the Op".")ortu.,ities for ITT nischief uhen dealing with the US vs. 
the Chilean or Ecu;:u.orean governments. 
It is well knmm that tGCs provide a package of services, difficult 
to untangle and cost separately. The package often can be said to 
include particular links to the international cot:llllunity, such as participa­
tion in the Paris Convention, when a host country is too weak to reject 
this fashion of signalling its commitment to a favorable investment 
climate. Local production of some comnodities by UNCs can also limit a 
host country's export potential and even its-.foreign policy. During 
1973 and early 1974, for example, there were reports that G.H. 
Argentina, Ford Argentina and Goodyear Argentina were waiting for US 
permission regarding possible industrial exports to Cuba, financed by 
15 · supplier credits from the Argentine government. 
Unless a host country makes a special and often jerky effort, 
involvements with HNCs are difficult to reverse. Note the 
difficulties wh•ich even well-behaved Canada has had to go through to buy 
back (at rather handsome prices) an interest in Texasgulf, Inc. Clearly, 
a marriage so difficult and painful to break up should be entered into 
only with the greatest of circumspection. The R0r1anian publication of 





appendices, in its official gazette, is an exdl:lple which LDCs should 
consider follo,..:ing. 
16 Whenever possible, of course, such LDC actions 
should be &dopted under conraon rules, to expand their bargaining leverage, 
in the spirit of the Andean group. 
The tendency of d21Cs to interact negatively with LDC m'arket imper­
fections and to replace both national and international markets for inter­
nal corporate planning explains uhy some market-oriented economists 
exµress serious reservations about their role in LDCs. Consider the follow­
ing two statements, one by Hla Hyint and the other by Ronald HcKinnon: 
"But it may be wondered whether, instead of their current policies of 
protection and selective admittance of foreign manufacturing industry, 
they [the LDCs] might not find a more promising 'second-best' _policy in 
combining restrictions on all foreign enterprises with free trade. 
1117 
on"Correspondingly, the bootstrap theory here implies that reliance 
foreign direct investment--with its package of finance, modern technology, 
and managerial skills--should be curtailed by LDCs themselves in order to 
. 18 
promote balanced indigenous development." 
That DFI carried out by large NNCs, particularly those with head­
quarters in hegemonic powers, often tend to replace markets and have a 
number of undesirable political and social effects, does not rule out the 
possibility that such agents frequently will turn out to be economically 
more efficient than the uncontrolled markets they replace. Centralized 
planning, either public ·or corporate, may improve on uncontrolled market 
perforr.iance, both theoretically and in- practice. Indeed, some popular 
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criticisDs of ~GlCs in the :lorth rel.:1te not to their nonopolizin~ ten­
dencies, but to t:1.:2 burdens of E",cljustin3 to ~GC actions ,,:1ich essentially 
reproduce i,;;1at co~:_;ctitive narkets would yield, but more brusquely and 
perhaps faster, as in the case of transferring labor-intensive uroduction 
fro."'.1 hi0h to lou-uage areas. 
It should also be noted that even if the DFI package could be totally 
untangled, aany LDCs uill still prefer at least sane a1aount of pack.asing, 
preferably in the for.n of joint ventures, as a way of insuring continuous 
access to the on-r,oin~ technolocical resenrch of foreign conpanies. Such 
deals will be healthier, however, when chosen over other options, especi­
ally the one of total unpackaging, as contrasted with their reluctant 
acceptance as the only possible way to obtain technology and capital. 
There is, of course, no economic reason why international capital 
movements should occur solely or primarily via ~mes. Before the great 
depression of the 193Os, large sums were transferred from DCs to. LDCs 
using debt instruments via capital markets which were no models of perfect 
competition, but which allowed greater flexibility, in many respects, 
than direct foreign investment. Technology, on the other hand, was 
transferred massively and largely independently of those capital flows. 
Influenced by the unfortunate experience of the 193Os, Anglo-Saxon 
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planners sou8ht to replace those narkets in the post World Har II new 
ordc::r partly by institutions such as the IBRD, for lone-term capital, and 
the International ~'.0.1.etary Fund (~fF), for short tern capital. The 
~r.1Cs also stepped into the void, beconin3 not only investors of their own 
funds, but also acting as financial interraediaries, borrmdng in DCs and 
in LDCs to invest within LDCs. · 
Hany DCs emerged fro1,1 the 1930s and the second world war with formal 
and informal regulations limiting foreign access to their national capital 
markets. Hot surprisingly, and until very recently, international capital 
markets worthy of that name remained thin and lethargic, shackled by re­
strictions and dominated by the competition from MNCs, the IBRD and the 
IMF. 
The remarkable upsurge during 1972/73 of LDC mediut1-term borrowing 
in the unregulated Eurodollar market, so far mostly in the form of bank 
loans, could signal a revival of the use of international markets to 
transfer capital from DCs to LDCs, as well as their use of interoediaries 
for capital flows within the LDC group. Without underestimating the 
danger that international capital markets could show increasing carteliza­
tion, nor that their expansion could jeopardize the development of those 
within LDCs, it nevertheless appears that transactions in the Eurodollar 
market between DC private institutions and LDC borrmvers show characteris­
tics of unintrusiveness, decomposibility and reversibility to a much greater 
extent than those involving HNCs. The list of borrowers include countries 
such as Algeria, Cuba, Hungary, Peru and Yugoslavia, which have not been 
favorites of HNCs. The Peruvian example may be particul3'lY significant, 
• • 
as much of that country's borrowing took place while the t-Iorld Bank, 
the Inter-Aoerican Development Bank, and of course AID, engafced in an 
informal financial blockade, following Peruvian nationalization of so~e 
direct foreign investnents. 
It is siQiif:.cr:..':.t tr,::i.t t:-.is trend rrns not r.:et with universal acclai;1. 
'i:nis })a!°tly reflect.s "l. leci ti:-ia.te concern for the fragility of t:1e Euro­
dollar narket and for t::e danbers of excessive borrowing by LDCs. But one 
also detects in some of the ·worried commentary a touch of the fear of the 
intemediarJ who is being cut out I and of the bureaucrat who is losing 
control and power. Others actually prefer a tied package to markets pro­
viding each component reparately. Some of these attitudes may be reflected 
in the following quotes from:..a recent speech by Williams. Gaud, executive 
vice president of the International Finance Corporation: 
"Nevertheless , I see very real risks for the developing countries in 
borrowing so heavily in a market with no established lending standards and 
no overall surveillance to prevent tmsound practices. There is IDother 
feature of these Euro-currency loans which should not be overlooked. 
Foreign private investment is important to the developing countries not only 
because it contributes capital for their development but because it brings 
with it technology, management, training and access to foreip,n market·s­
items which are all in short supply in the Third World. Euro-currency loans 
bring with them none of these. Indeed, they are often made even without 
any appraisal of the soundness of the prqjects they are int;nded to finance. "19 
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Suitably extended and reinforced, on uhich more below, a reasonably 
coc,petitive international (private) narket for LDC debt can provide a 
useful arena for economic interaction between DCs and many LDCs. This 
is the path of independence and a miniI:lUI!l of controls, as put by Charles 
. . f , . h . 20P. Kind1eberger in his p1one~r1ng advocacy o tnis t esis. But the 
LDCs comoitted to a market econooy would do well to expand also their own 
internal capital markets. The richest ~nd.more sophisticated LDCs can 
also increasingly take a bigger share of the profits from intermediation 
by developing their own financial institutions, capable of operating 
at the international level, particularly for flows among LDCs (and!_ 
fortiori for flows among nationals of the same LDC) • 
IX Concessional Finance 
The two arenas singled out as particularly favorable for DC-LDC 
interaction, i.e., corrmodity and debt markets, even if working well may 
leave the population of the least developed countries, devoid of nruch of 
·a natural resource base and therefore not creditworthy by current com­
mercial standards, in extreme poverty for the foreseeable future. These 
countries provide the strongest argument for the continuation of interna­
tional concessional financial flows, which otherwise share with direct 
foreign investment low grades in standoffishness, although doing somewhat 
better in decomposibility, 21 and nuch better in reversibility or ability 
to tenuinate the arrangement relatively smoothly. 
It may be possible that international concessional finance going to 
the least developed countries will include in the future the participation 
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of other, ttore prosperous LDCs, particularly in regions with a strong 
sense of cultural solidarity, such as L.atin ,.'\nerica and the ?-!oslen nations. 
Be that as it oay, aid to the least developed countries will be more success­
ful when targetted to a clearly defined charitable purpose, like avoidinp, 
a faraine, than ,1hen seeking more general goals, i.e., proooting develop­
ment. This, of course, will not surprise those who have followed the 
aid story_ during the last twenty years. 
The orders of magnitude for concessional finance which realistically 
can be e:~pec ted durin:; the foreseeable future do not warrant much dis-
cussion of this fonn of DC-LDC interaction. Looking back, it is clear 
that the attention given by academics and others to this area was out of 
proportion to its actual or potential importance for development in most .. 
LDCs. 
The soft windows of existing multilateral institutions, such as the IBRD-
IDA and the regional development banks, are likely to continue limping along un­
draraatically, except in the 1.n1likely case that they were to receive large and 
steady funds from SDR-link scheaes, fran oil-rich stat~s, or from controlling sea­
beds. Those institutions will have to rely mainly on their usefulness as inter-
mediaries between world capital markets and LDCs which find direct access 
to those markets too expensive, or which prefer, for a variety of reasons, 
to place part of their debt with multilateral institutions. The greater 
variety of possible sources of finance open to the more advanced LDCs will 
no doubt put some competitive pressure on the World Bank group and on 
regional development banks. Such pressures may lead to difficult dilemmas 
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for those institutions: viewed as organizations wishing to survive and 
expand or <lesirins to influence donestic LDC policies, they will want to 
woo their "best custoners," such as Hexico, Nigeria, Brazil and Thailand. 
But fror:i a development viewpoint, they should consider charging hieher 
rates of interest to their best customers (who may then stop borrowing 
from them), while passing on to the poorest countries via lower interest 
rates all of the gains obtained by public raultilateral borrowing. 
The influence which bilateral or multilateral aid agencies will be 
able to exert on the domestic priorities of borrowing countries will 
continue to wane for those LDCs with alternative borrowing possibilities. 
Regardless of the good intentions of those attempting to guide LDC 
priorities, or of the wisdom of whichever happens to be the fasionable 
top priority at a given time among world development executives, the 
experience of the last ten years suggests that such waning is mostly to 
the good. Whatever the levels of concessional bilateral or multilateral 
aid which remain to be granted in the future are. they would best be 
disbursed quietly and routinely, with a greater sense 9f automaticity 
22. h h . 1 . h . ' d . ff ·and wit out too muc invo vement in ot er countries omestic a airs. 
X. International ;.;c,netarv Reforn 
One major LDC interest in international monetary reform, narrowly 
defined, is to obtain the scheme most favorable to smoothly expanding world 
trade in a multilateral framework. On this point all LDCs, la.ree and small, 
as well as DCs, appear to aGree. One can go further and suggest that as 
most LDCs are (and are likely to remain for a long t~e) net debtors, they 
will benefit fron a system yielding a world a0grecate demand such that it 
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~ , ... _ ...... - .J._ ·.; -. ~ ,... ,._.,il1J.uce s ..... .1. ... -~ ::..-..., - '· -- ~- .... 
level resu.ltine fron cost-push forces in tile ind'..!stria.li zed ,-.·orlc., :;:artici.~-:..2..rl~~ 
if acconpanied b~r slack capacity utilization in tl1ose co1.U1tries, :~o·wever, is 
u:1likel~· to· be acconpc..."J.:.ed. l;y ~,;tern.:11 cin:.llr.lstar.::es which are on balance 
favorable for LDCs. 
A relatively flexible excha."lge rate systen, with rules :'or crawling 
or ~icelinc, ~~ong industrialized countries and large and/or inflationary 
LlJCs seens most suitable to the maintenance of full capacity use and ex:pand-
ing world trade. It is at first sic;ht so:r.iewhat surprising that LDCs as a 
group,, a group within which sMall LDCs have the r.iost votes, have supported 
fixed rates for the DCs. ~he. explanation, however, seems straightforward. 
Economically snall and open LDCs, small and open with respect to both trade and 
finance, will usually want to maintain fixed parities vis-a-vis a major indus­
trial power, for optimur.i. currency area reasons, whatever the world exchange 
rate system is. Thus, Guatemala will want to keep its currency pegged to 
the U.s. dollar, Chad will wish to peg to the French franc, etc. Hote that 
even large Mexico wishes to remain pegged to the u.s. dollar. Given such 
a starting point, it is not surprising that those LDCs will prefer the 
major currency to which they peg to remain in turn pegged to the rest of 
the world, particularly when their trade, althoug.11 oriented toward one indus­
trial power, hes a reasonable degree of geographic diversification. This will 
not only maxir.~ze the econonic benefits derived from opti:r.rum currency area 
considerations, but it will also cloak.the unpleasant nee-colonial flavor 
of being in a dollar area, a franc area, etc. A world without an obvious 
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sin8le in tern2.tional noney also presents a nur:.ber of oinor headaches for 
oanasers of LDC external asset and debt portfolios. finally, it can be 
argued that as LDCs wish to expand the ar:iount of SDRs issued, even under 
present rules, they will naturally oppose exchange regimes which would 
23 
reduce the need for international reserves. 
The gross loss to snall (and not-so-small) LDCs of having the industrial­
ized countries move to more flexible exchange rates, however, may be in fact 
turned into a net t:;<1in when one co:::.pares that scenario not with the :p!'e-
1971 world, but with realistic alternative monetar-J arrangeY:1.ents for the 
future. A future system of pegged rates among industrial countries is 
unlikely to work without severe controls over trade and capital flows, or 
without a close and cozy degree of policy coordination among DCs. Neither 
prospect should be particularly attractive to LDCs, which may not escape 
even under a fornall~' fixed exchange rate system the danc;ers of hegemonic 
currency areas and preferential zones. In spite of the image projected by 
official declarations, this is in fact rec"~nized h~r nany LX policy-makers. 
Contrar-J to some panicked cor.Jr.1entary, the LDC experience in the post-
1971 world has been, so far and on balance, quite £Ood, and manv an LDC Central 
Bank has learned. that it is not so difficult to keep tabs on cross-rates or 
to calculate reasonable portfolio combinations in different currencies. 
While erantinc that the extraordinary 1972/73 comnodity boom has helped 
adjustnent to the new order a good deal, it must also be pointed out that 
forces fuelling that boom, including fiscal and monetary policies in the 
North, were encouraged by the new floating policies. It may also be noted 
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that while flexible rates in major financial centers are supposed to 
discou rn~e, ce te ris n.r:ib~:s, international capital flows, the post-1971 
world has \.'::.tnessed a lar~:e expansion of LDC activity in those markets. 
In stort, a 1:-orld tradine comuni t~· wi ti1 lo',; P.nd decreasing DC con-
trols over co:rrz:od.it~r a.'1.d cupital :~lows, with expe..'1.dinc trade, and with 
loose policy coordination a;1onc DCs is difficult to visualize without the 
adoption b~• those countries of reasonably flexible exchange rates. Such a 
srster.i, while providing LDCs a potentially favorable external enviromnent, 
will impose some minor adjustment costs to many of them. A weak case could be 
made for compensating them for such costs via nore favorable allocations of 
Special Drawinr, Rights ( SDRs) • 
On the assur1ption that IT1ajor industrial countries will consolidate a sys­
tem of floating exchange rates, while most non-inflationary and small Ll)Cs will 
keep fixed rates in tenns of one of the key currencies, it can be argued 
that the reserve needs of the latter will be greater than those of the 
24fomer, relative to their shares in world trade, Participation in SDR 
allocations, and perhaps IHF q_uotas, could be expected· to adjust to this 
new situation. It could also be expected that the rules for crawling which 
may emere;e from international monetary reform will :make allowances for the 
different characteristics of LDC balance of payments situations, rather 
than rigidly tryin~ to aPoly the same rules to all, re2ardle~R of serious 
structural differences. For example, a net debtor can be expected to keep 
a level of gross international liquid reserves different from those of a 
net creditor. LDCs exporting exhaustible natural resources may, in their 
optimization plans through time, acc\.llllulate large liquid reserves in the 
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near future, to be Jra'.7!1 do~•rn at a later date. Rir;id rules built around 
reserve levels, or even chan~es in levels, would ne~lect those special 
circumstances. 
A tactical decision for I..DCs as a group has been whether to seek to 
bran.den nc£otiations for a new international ooneta.ry order· into a more 
general discussion of international econonic reform, in the spirit of 
1944, and if so, on which related issues to concentrate their bargaining 
power. So far, the LDCs have chosen to emphasize plans for a link betveen 
SDR creation and a favorable allocation to LDCs. Such proposals have run 
into serious opposition. At bottom, the non-academic opponents are unwilling 
to yield DC political control over the grant element which would be involved in 
link schemes. At the same tir::ie, however, and r.iainly for tech~ical reasons, 
the idea that SDRs should bear an interest rate not too far below those 
rulin:e in the_ world markets for prine short term paper has eained eround. 
This implies that net users of SDRs would gain less net real resources even 
from favorable allocations. The use of SDRs would then become an a.ttractive 
fom of borrowing for LDCs, particularly to those with weak international 
credit standing, but not ~ different from. other foms of borrowing. 
It may well be that a reallocation of I:lF quotas and SDR allocations, 
justified primarily by ceneralized floating by industrial countri.es plus 
widespread pegging by LDCs, and the recognition of special LDCs balance of 
payments problems, with greater quotas and SDR allo~~tions going to the 
LDCs, is all that can be expected at the moment. This, of course, could 
be made to yield some net gains.to LDCs as a group. 
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There arc other issues of international econor.iic reform uhere LDC 
bargainin~ pm-~cr could be fruitfu::.ly applied under present circumstances. 
Reduction of DC protection for ccn~o<lities of srecial LDC export interest, 
and the reuoval of DC practices restricting the diffusion of technolocical 
knm.rledge have been already nentioned as candide1tes for discussion. 
An important area which has been ner,lected so far in international 
monetary discussions is the establishment of liberal and clear rules 
guaranteeins LDC access to the national capital markets of industrialized 
nations. This may be partly explained by the boom in LDC borrowing in the 
international Eurodollar market. But the lesson from that experience is 
then not being correctly learned. Such boom does show that very large 
sums, estimated at around $8 Billion in 1972 and more in 1973, can be 
mobilized by LDCs with a minimum of strings, via international capital 
markets. There is, however, some truth to the criticism that the Eurodollar 
market is still a fragile and limited capital market. For example, LDC 
borrowing has been heavily in the form of bank loans with maturities of 
not much more than 10 years and with floating interest rates; the market 
for long-term LDC bonds has not expanded very r:uch yet. The continuity 
of these flows is far fran assured. 
It is time to consolidate LDC advances in the Eurodallar market by 
extending them to the national capital markets of DCs. Restrictive rules 
on DC imports of LDC debt paper, inherited often frOiil the 1930s, have 
survived almost intact,·even as the corresponding rules for cocnnodity 
imports were gradually liberalized during the post-war. Those restrictive 
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rules may sometimes appear not to be binding simply because the discourage­
ment they signal precludes the actual testing of the limits they impose. 
Frequently, the rules on debt inports are not just restrictive, formally 
or informally, but also discriminatory. Thus, in sane DC national capital 
markets only favored LDCs, u~ually ex-colonies, are allowed to place their 
debt papers. At a time when international monetary reform is being dis­
cussed, certainly these are matters which ~eserve a close review by DCs and 
LDCs. The payoff could be substantial, not only in increased capital 
availability to LDCs and lower borrowing costs, but also in decreasing 
the political frictions associated with other forms of capital transfer 
between DCs and LDCs. Possible large financial surpluses of some oil­
exporting states support the need to develop and strength~n world 
financial markets. 
It could be argued that easier access to external capital markets will 
only benefit large, resource-rich LDCs, with a diversified or very lucra­
tive export bill. However, even small, undiversified LDCs have been borrow­
ing in the Eurodollar market. Furthermore, smaller LpGs could band together 
to enter international capital markets, as the relatively poor Central 
American countries have done. In some cases, more prosperous LDCs could 
guarantee the debt instruments of less fortunate LDCs. Regional and sub­
regional development banks could be used as instruments in these activities, 
in the same fashion that similar institutions could be used by small and 
medium size LDCs to handle their joint search for, and purchase of, foreign 
technology. Organizations would thus be created or strengthened to improve 
the conditions of access to world markets by the smaller mes, institutions 
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which crul<l be turned around to accelerate cor.unercial integration within 
the ;:;roup if world market circuustances turned adverse. Had !...:itin .4.1:.1erica 
developed such institutions during the 1920s, its crash industrialization 
prograi:is during 1930-1945 ~!Ould have been probably both more ar.ihitious 
and rational. 
LDCs cornr.1itted to a mixed dcnestic economy plus active links to 
world cor..tiodity and financial markets will find a growing need for 
sophisticated management in their fiscal, monetary and exchange rate 
policies. Hhile those world r.1arkets during the 1970s have opened up neu 
options for LDCs, they also lirait freedom of action regarding the~ of 
daaestic policy instruments. The kind of free-wheeling experimentation 
with domestic policy tools which many mixed economy LDCs under,;;,ent 
durine the 1950s has now become riskier and potentially cost:lier. 
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XI. A Few Final Remarks 
This paper has been written around two basic working hypotheses, 
one political and one economic. The former assumes a multipolar world, 
with several ~ajar centers of political and military power, all limited 
in their l1er,emonic preteasions by the nuclear stalemate. Out of such 
political underp:.:,:-:.::;:;s, relatively free international mark~ts could 
provide a plau~;ib.ie neci1anisu for interdependence among the citizens cif 
different states. The basic economic hypothesis, which has a somewhat 
nee-Leninist flavor, is that for the foreseeable future the North will 
have a substantial and growing excess demand for Southern cor:unodities, 
mainly but not exclusively for primary products, plus· an excess supply of 
finance capital, a supply which could be enlarged by the surplus funds of 
some oil-rich LDCs. The North can also be expected to maintain an excess 
supply of new technology and capital goods. Handled via relatively open 
international markets, those circumstances can yield gains for all parti­
cipants. 
Much of t:1is, of course, is alread:r ~appenin~~ But those markets 
are still quite imperfect, and will always be at the mercy of political 
decisions regardin3 whether·and how they will be allowed to operate. 
Those in LDCs and DCs interested in obtaining both economic efficiency 
and national autonomy would do well to use whatever bargaining power 
they have to strengthen those markets. The Southern countries are not 
without bargaining strengths, and can be expected to use them with in­
creasing sophistication to achieve less asymnetrical international econ0t:1ic 
relations. Their potential bargaining strength arises not only from 
conflicts at:1ong the Uorthem count.ries, but also fron clashes of interest 
25 among <lifferent groups w·ithin industrialized states. 
Besides concessional aid to the poorest LDCs, there trill reoain sone 
areas of econcwic interaction between DCs and LDCs where it may be 
difficult to even ina~ine the operations of decentralized narkets, and 
where poltical C:.2cisionn will have to be quite open and explicit, often 
involvinG the creation of supra-national authorities to regulate economic 
activity. An obvious exax:1ple involves the economic use of the cor:inons 
of nankind, particularly the seas and the seabed assets for r-1hich nobody has 
ownership titles. The only alternative to an explicity political settlement 
in this area, where potentially large pure rents are up for grabs, is a de facto 
or de jure enclosure novenent using technologica1 , po11.t1.ca. . 1 and · 1 · 
26
mi 1.tary pmver. 
~ 
Leav1ng aside difficulties associated with non-appropriated resources, 
it is perhaps uorth eophasizing that one should not exaggerate the ease of 
obtaining, even granting political willincness to do so, efficient, 
stable and competitive world commodity markets, particularly for exhaustible 
natural resources. Hotions of different discount rates, intergenerational 
equity, conservation and inevitable uncertainties about future technologies 
greatly complicate the picture, heating up the scramble for control of large 
rents. If, as in the case of oil, sellers of those commodities generate 
surpluses, for which investments ·with small risk and reasonable returns are 
difficult to find without the cooperation of COllltlodity buyers, the tangle 
becomes monumental, even if producers and buyers were many and competitive. 
Some politization of these markets may. thus be inevitable, except perhaps 
in a world where natural resources were evenly divided among 350 countries 
having 10 million inhabitants each. 
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::ore 13enerally, it is <lifficult to visualize any futcre international 
cor.::1unity ~ith even nini:.1ua clains to lq:;it:i..-:1acy an<l fairness whic!1 would 
e.'(clude LDCs fror.1 negotiations scttlin:3 \.:orldwide econouic i:1atters either 
directly or by establishinG nar:"et rules of the gane. Full L.TJC participa­
tion in international tra<le a,1d nonetary reforn discussions, even if it 
2 7spoils past clubby atmospi1ereg, should thus be regarded not as an absent­
minded concession by DCs, but as a first step toward full WC participation 
in world economic planning. 
FOOTI~OTES 
*An earlier draft of this paper benefitted zreatly from criticisms 
received during a conference held at the Brookings Institution on 
January 10-12, 1974. Detailed comments from c. Fred Bergsten, Benjamin 
I. Cohen, Richard :'.1. Cooper, William Diebold, Jr., Gerald K. Helleiner, 
Alberto. Hir.:c·,!~,:a:i., Lm:rence B. Krause, Charles P. Kindleberger, Vahid 
Nowshirvani and Gustav Ranis are also gratefully acknowledged. Many of 
the ideas in this paper were either picked up from the work of Stephen 
Hymer, or were developed as a reaction to his stimulating thought. This 
paper is dedicated to his memory. 
1see, for example, Simon Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth, New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1966, and Hollis B. Chenery, "Alternative Strate­
gies for Development," paper presented to the Rehovot Conference on 
Economic Growth and Developing Countries, September 1973. 
2
This paragraph paraphrases William R. Cline, "Income Distribution and 
Economic Development: A Survey and Tests for Selected Latin American 
Cities," paper prepared for ECIEL International Conference on Consumption, 
Income and Prices, Hamburg, October 1973, P• 50. 
3As put by Premier Chou En-lai, in his report to the 10th National Con­
gress of the Chinese Communist Party: 
"They content as well as collude with each other. 
Their collusion serves to the purpose of more intensified 
contention. Contention is absolute and protracted, where­
as collusion is relative and temporary." 
New York TL~es, 1 Septeober 1973, p. 6. 
As an exauple of what the cartelized world would look like, consider 
the follo~-.1ing remarks of IIr. Harold Geneen, President of ITT: 
"Uhat these countries [the LDCs] need most are long­
tena investments. If our government is not going to 
support us, there is going to be less investment. The 
answer may be a multinational approach. By this I mean 
the Ge·rmana, the Swiss, the World Bank, and others share 
. in the investment. Then six cotmtries are involved, not 
one. If something goes wrong, the countries can get tough 
and do things. You don't go to l?ar, but maybe everybody 
refuses to give the offending country credits." 
Business \leek, 3 November 1973, p. 44. 
411To achieve efficiency in world production it is unnecessary that both 
commodities and factors move freely. If it were not for the probleme • 
of transporting interest payments ••• one mobile factor will be suffi­
cient to ensure price equalization." Robert A. Mundell, International 
Economics, New York, The Macmillan Canpany, 1968. p. 95. In this barter 
model interest is paid in the form of commodities. 
5some have argued that this last statement exaggerates the adjustment 
·burden borne by migrant workers already residing in Western Europe, claim­
ing that changes in the demand for labor are mainly reflected in the 
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gross inflow rate of fresh guest workers. Nevertheless, a real burden 
remains. The Economist of London reported in its issue for 26 January 
1974, p. 43, in a story entitled "Holiday at Your Peril," reluctance 
among Turkish workers in the Federal Republic of Gennany of returning 
home for ri.ew year holidays, for fear of being fired while they were away. 
The report added: 
" ••• how do the foreign workers, who make up a tenth of 
the German labour force, feel? Very frightened indeed••• 
The way to protect Geman workers, and at the same 
time avoid paying out millions of marks in unemployment 
benefits, would seem to be to encourage a million or so 
foreigners to go hane. The problem is how. 
One idea that has been kicked around ••• is that the 
foreign workers should be given a departing financial 
handshake ••• Other, cruder, methods are rather more 
effective. At local level, a wink from an employer to a 
local authority can result in the non-renewal of work and 
residence permits. Or accommodations that used to be con­
sidered acceptable can suddenly become 'uninhabitable' •" 
6The Economist of London, 9 February 1974, p. 48. The same article 
reports that Germany plans an outright ban on further guest-workers hirings 
in cities with an immigrant population of more than a quarter of the total, 
a kind of crude rule-of-thumb restriction much lamented when imposed by 
LDCs on DFI. 
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7
In an article infoming readers on the editorial page of The 1{.1.ll ~ tree t 
Journal, 13 Deceraber 19i2, p. 22, that "the relations anonc; nations are 
governed by a few fragile convenants which we call international lau, by 
soue vague consensus of ~rnrld opinion vhich Pe call international r::orality 
and, above all, by comnon se?-se," the Henry Luce Professor of Urban Values 
at New York University, Dr. Irving Kistol, goes on to say: 
"Gunboats are as necessary for international order as 
police cars are for domestic order. Smaller nations are 
not really worried about AI:lerican atom boobs any more than 
the Hafia is. And smaller nations are.. not going to behave 
reasonably--with a decent respect for the interests of others, 
including the great powers--unless it is costly to them to 
behave unreasonably." 
8
see the stimulating article by Walker Connor, ''Nation-Building or 
Nation-Destroying,", in Horld Politics (April 1972), pp. 319-355. He 
charges that theoreticians of LDC nationalism and "nation-building" have 
slighted problems associated with ethnic diversity. One could speculate 
that in the same fashion economists have sought to define optimal currency 
areas, political scientists could attempt defining optimal nation-states, 
bearing in mind ethnic diversity, which plays the role of factor imnobility 
in limiting larger optimal areas. 
9The Keynes plan for commodities, recently unearthed fran British 
archives by Dr. Lal Jayawardena and to be published in a forthcoming issue 




in discussions about a new international monetary and economic order. 
Ihe second draft dated Decerr~er 1942 opens by referring to the fourth 
point of the Atlantic Charter, quoted above. Note that the Keynes plan coupled 
"freedom of access" for DCs to "freedom of sales" at predictable pi;ices for LDCs, 
a point ignored by most DC o~servers and officials. In his original draft, 
Keynes starts by calling for the internationalization of Vice-President 
Wallace's "ever-nomal granary." I recently heard a brilliant mainstrean 
US political economist justify-US bans on its wheat exports; he went on to 
argue that wheat sales should only be permitted to foreign countries 
willing to sign long term-purchase agreements. He was clearly sur-
prised by, and failed to answer, a question as to whether he also 
advocated long term contracts for US purchases of primary products. 
It is not without certain irony that the same officials who not long 
ago turned down Venezuelan requests for greater access to the US oil 
market now complain of unreliability of foreign oil supplies. lt is 
also ironic that as late as September 13, 1973,. The New York Times, p. 71, 
reported attempts by US diplomats to organize a boycott of Libyan oil. 
lOS w··11·ee 1. 1.am D. Nordhaus, "The Allocation of I:nergy Resources," 
Brookings Papers~ Economic Activity, 3: 1973, pp. 529-571. Using 
energy as an example of exhaustible resou~ces,_and noting that besides 
the basic economic problems (lack of futures markets, uncertainty about 
future technology, etc.), political interference is also present, Nordhaus 
remarks: 
"It takes an act of faith to b'elieve that "the market" 
can somehow see the proper allocation through this tangle 
-. 
of complexity, uncertainty, and politics" (p. 538). 
11
The improvement of LDC foreien trade policies by itself cannot be 
expected to provide automatically in all countries substantial help in 
achieving development targets~ beside faster growth, not related directly 
to the foreign trade sector. For exarlple, export prcmotion policies may 
in some countries hurt equity in inco~e distribution (by much or little), 
while helping equity in others (by much or little). leither qualitative 
nor quantitative generalizations appear warranted regarding the link 
between. trade policies arid income distribution. The problem, relevant 
also for DCs, is that different positive theories of trade have different 
implications for incane distribution and, therefore, for political attitudes 
toward freer trade. If one believes, for example, that the key source of 
canparative advantage for a given country is a large endowment of capital 
to labor, one will expect _!!!, capitalists to be pro-trade biased as 
compared to.!!!_ laborers. But if the key source of comparative advantage 
is best explained by research and development in new products, industries 
leading in that field will be the main champions of freer trade. 
12
rn passing, it may be noted that tourism is-made more palatable to host 
countries by t~e application of the Calvo doctrine to foreign guests. The 
·:··.+··· .
occassional injustices suffered by DC tourists at the ~ands of unscrupu-
lous LDC officials abusing the Calvo doctrine has not led to many calls 
for international arbitration tribunals, a~ far as I know, but to some 
passable popular songs, like Tijuana Jail. Nevertheless, it shoula be noted 
that alleged fears for the lives of DC nationals happening to be visiting 
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a given LDC going through acute po1itical turmoil, have been used as excuse 
to land DC "guest troops" (without visas or tourist cards) into LDCs. 
13
See, for exaople, Constantine Vaitsos, "Transfer of Resources 
and Preserv~tion of ::fo::iopoly Rents," iui.meogrrq,;1cd~ April 1970; Jorge M. Katz, 
"Patents, the Paris convention and less developed countries," Yale 
Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 190, November 1973; and 
Edith Penrose, "International patenting and the less developed countries," 
The Economic Journal, September 1973, pp. 768-86. 
14
Jagdish Bhagwati anrl lJilliat1 Dallalfar have advanced a concrete 
prope>sal along these lines in their paper, "The Brain Drain and Income 
Taxation: A Proposal," Working Paper No. 92, H.I.T. Department of Economics, 
September- 1972. 
15see B . . A •usiness Latin raerica, 12 December 1973, pp. 393-394. Canadian 
subsidiaries of US-owned firms have also been plagued by this issue. Re­
cently, a Canadian political leader asked: 
"On what basis is it necessary for the Canadian 
Government to request the intercession of a foreign 
government in an export deal between a Canadian company 
and some other company?" 
The New York Times, 6 March 1974, p. 47. Sane hope exists that the US 
will finally decide to end its extraterritorial claims on foreign sub­
sidiaries of US-owned firms during 1974. 
16See report in Business ~, 8 December 1974 ("A Warm Hand for US 
Business"), pp. 24 and 27. The Wall Street Journal reported on 30 August 
-viii-
1973, p. 8, tl1at Senator Lloyd Bentsen of Texas had personally appeared in 
court to express his re::3ervations about the Canadian attempts to purchase 
Texasgulf, Inc. 
17111a l:Iyint, "Inten1ational Trade and the Developing Countries," in 
P.A. Samuelson, editor, International Economic Relations, MaCI:1illan, 
London, 1969, p. 35. 
18Ronald I. HcKinnon, Money and Capital~ The Brookings Institution, 
Washington, D.C., 1973, p. 172. Both Myint and McKinnon refer favorably 
to the Japanese experience during the Meiji period. 
19william s. Gaud, ''Private Investment and Local Partnership, 11 speech 
at a Financial Times conference on the European Community and the Third 
World, 7 November 1973, pp. 2-4. The same speech notes the, sensitivity 
of the Euro-currency market to speculative waves, and the difficulty of 
planning investments i:mder the Eurodollar regime of floating interest 
rates. It should be noted that Mr. Gaud recognizes positive feature in 
LDC Eurodollar market borrowing. 
20 see Charles P. Kindleberger, "Less Developed Countries and the Inter­
national Capital Market," in Industrial Organization and Economic Development, 
In Honor of E.S. Mason, edited by Jesse W. Markham and Gustav v. Papanek, 
Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1970, pp. 337-349. See also Richard N. Cooper 
and Edwin M. Truman, "An Analysis of the Role of International Capital 
Markets in Providing Funds to Developing Co\llltries, 11 Weltwirtschaftliches 
Archiv, June 1971, Number 2 1 pp. 153-182. It should be clear that interna-
1-
-ix-
tional bankers must not be credited with extraordinary angelic virtues, and 
LDCs ~ust be on guard to prevent 1920s-type abuses arising from high 
pressure salesoanship, nore recently associated with suppliers' credits. 
21
Aid, particularly bilateral aid, is likely to be tied not only to com­
modities fror.1 the donor country, but also to accepting donor country's 
direct forei;n investuent. As expressed by the US Secretary of the Treasury, 
Dr. George P. Schultz: 
"Every sovereii;n nation has, of course, the right 
to regulate the terms and conditions under which private 
investment is admitted or to reject it entirely. Uhen 
such capital is rejected, we find it difficult to under-
stand that official donors should be asked to fill the gap."• 
The New York Times, 26 September 1973, P• s. 
22Th. . .1s viewpoint is eloquently presented by I.G. Patel, "Aid Relation-
ship for the Seventies," in Barbara Ward ~ .!!_, Editors, i'ne Widening Gap; 
Development in the i970's, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 
pp. 295-334. See also Alberto. Hirschman and Richard M. Bird, "Foreign 
Aid--A Critique and A Proposal," Princeton Essavs in International Finance, 
No. 69, July 1968. 
23See Gerald K. Helleiner, "The Less Developed Countries and the Inter-
national Monetary System," Journal of Development Studies, forthcoming 
during 1974.. Some LOCs, confident in their resources and macroeconomic mana~e­
ment, may consider that disturbances are more likely to arise outside than in­
side their economies, and therefore will use changes in their exchange rate to 
shield themselves from inflation coming from the industrialized world. For 
example, Venezuela has revalued its currency with respect to the dollar in 
recent years for this purpose. 
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24rnflationary LDCs 1 i.e., those whose price levels rise chronically 
at a faster rate than the ,;orld price level, o:- that of the major industrial 
countr:· to "i1ich tliey ,:ould othen,ise pei;, nay nl~o have a ler,itimate 
claim to larger reserves if all their crawlinG pegs achieve is the 
elimination of the difference in inflationary trends, without seriously 
smoothing out. other sources df balance of paynents disturbances, which 
may remain virulent in those countries. 
25Onthis· point· see t he outstand ing. d ocument presented by Tanzania. to 
the Lusaka conference of nonaligned states, Cooperation Acainst Poverty, 
Dar es Salaam, Government Printer, United Republic of Tanzania, 1970. 
26
Those confident of their technological and military muscle are 
calling for just that. The Wall Street Journal, 17 December 1973, p. 14, 
has editorially suggested that the US should withdraw from the UN Law 
of the Sea conference, in the following tenns: 
"Enough is enough. For the sake of form, the 
United States may as well send its negotiators to Vene­
zuela and Vienna, though there is much to recommend a 
clean break. But the important thing is that the US govern­
ment should free the petroleum and mining industries of 
any caveats linked to some future treaty, and let them go 
to work adding to the world's store of available resources." 
27
0n September 21, 1973, The Wall Street Journal, p. 12, reported 
frOiil Nairobi that: 
"For all their old complaints, though, officials of 
industrial countries now find it difficult to suppress 
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their lonr;ing for the days when they could '[;leet i-rithout 
having to share every secret with, or explain every 
technicality to, the Tanzanians and Chileans." 
